"Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide" by Adelman, Howard & Suhrke, Astri
Early Warnirg and Response: Why the
International Community Failed to
Prevent :the Genocide
HOWARD ADELMAN, York University, Toronto, and ASTRI SUHRKE,
Christian Michelsen Institute, Norway
'Western leadership .. . has proclaimed moral indifference to be its decent
Christian right' jotin le Carr6 (1995, p. 213).
The enormity of the genocide in Rwanda demands that it be subjected to searching
enquiry and that members of the international community, collectfuely and
indiaidually, examine their own roles in the eaent.
This paper draws extensiaely on Study II of the loint Eualuation, and examines
the effectiveness of international monitoring (early warning) and management of the
Rwanda conflict. It is not intended to explore all the factors which together contrtbutud
ta the genocide that were or might haae been amenable to modifiutioi by the
internatianal communi$. The focus is on warning and response beginning uith the
start of the civil war in 1990, and culminating in an analysis of tie international
response to the genocide in April-lune L994.
INTRODUCTION
Evaluators and historians have the luxury
of hindsight to criticise actions and inac-
tions that subsequently appear inappro-
priate. Any search for lessons from the
tragedy must, however, avoid retrospec-
tive speculation. Decision.makers were
faced with often confusing signals, numer-
ous competing demands for their attention
and limitations on the resources at their
disposal. Critical policy theory was used
by the evaluators to weigh the formulation
and execution of policies against their
stated objectives as well as accepted inter-
national norms for the behaviour of states
and organisations. This paper, like the
study before it, is based on a number of
sub-studies, secondary sources as well as
considerable primary data collected
through interviews and document
searches in the UN system, the NGO
community and visits to national capitals
in Europe, North America and Africa.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENTS OF 1959.-52
Having administered the country through
the Tutsi aristocracy for four decades, the
Belgian colonial authoritiesr turned their
support towards the majority Hutu in the
late-1950s 
- 
a switch driven by the realisa-
tion of the inevitability of the de-colonisa-
tion process, the logic of democratic rule
and Belgian resentment that the strongest
calls for independence were coming from
among the favoured Tutsi class. After the
so<alled 'peasant revolt' of Hutu against
the Tutsi ruling class in 1959, during which
thousands of Tutsi were killed and tens of
thousands fled the country, the colonial
authorities installed a military-led adminis-
tration and took the opportunity of placing
Hutu appointees in chief and sub-chief
posts vacated by Tutsi.
The table-turning process was carried
forward by the ovetwhelming victory of
the PARMEHUTU party in the local elec-
tions of 1960, the parliamentary elections
ot1967 and the referendum of 1967 which
saw the massive rejection of the monarchy
in favour of a republican system of govern-
ment. The process was accompanied by
sporadic fighting between Tutsi and Hutu,
and the persecution of Tutsi as the Hutu
increased their grip on power. By late
1963, at least 130,000 Tutsi had sought
refuge in the neighbouring Belgian Congo
(now Zaire), Burundi, Uganda and Tan-
gyanika (now Tanzania). Some estimates
of the numbers involved have been much
higher.
The speed of the switch in the configu-
ration of Rwandan politics, and an aware-
ness that it could leave the country with an
embittered Tutsi minority, provoked con-
siderable criticism of Belgium's policy in
the UN General Assembly,2 and repeated
calls for the encouragement of a process
of national reconciliation. The Belgian
administration rejected the calls, and
sought to head off further UN 'tinkering'
by organising a de facto declaration of
independence in early 196tby the acdama-
tion of over 3,0(X) bourgemestres and munici-
pal councillors. The country achieved
formal independence in July 1%2.
A report by the UN Trusteeship Com-
mission in early 1961 noted:
The developments of these last eighteen
menths have brought about the racial dicta-
torship of one party. .. . An oppressive
system has been replaced by another one.
. . . It is quite possible that some day we will
witness violent reactions on the part of the
Tutsi (cited in Prunier, 1995).
By 1961., armed incursions into
Rwanda by Tutsi refugees had begun;
these continued until 1967. The main base
for these initial attacks was Burundi which
continued to be governed by a Tutsi
minority. One attack into the Bugasera
area in late 1.963 came quite close to
reaching Kigali, but mostly the attacks
were neither well organised nor adequate-
ly resourced. Inside Rwanda, which had
become a de facto single-party state, Tutsi
were increasingly excludedfrom public life
and armed incursions were not only
repulsed, but bouts of anti-Tutsi violence
flared; an estimated 10,fi)0 Tutsi were
slaughtered in the Bugasera area following
the 1963 incursion (Prunier, 1995).
Another wave of anti-Tutsi violence took
place in L972-3 fuelled by events in Bur-
undi where tens of thousands of Hutu had
been massacred by the Tutsi minority in a
bid to remain in power.
Such repression and violence swelled
the number of Rwandan Tutsi living in
exile in neighbouring countries. When
allowance is made for natural population
growth amont this group, by the 1990s the
total number of refugees was in the order
of 500,000-700,000 (Prunier, 7995),
although the political and propaganda srg-
nificance of such estimates and the difficul-
ties of accurately measuring such a widely
distributed population makes any figure a
matter of dispute. With the overthrow of
the Hutu PARMEHUTU dictatorship andits
replacement by a dictatorship from the
north-west under Habyarimana in 173, the
persecution of, though not the discrimi-
nation against, Tutsi stopped. Habyari-
mana, however, steadfastly refused to allow
the Tutsi refugees to return.
In 1981 a small number of the Tutsi
refugees in Uganda joined one of the
groups opposed to the regime of President
Obote. The group was led by Yoweri
Museveni, who was related (though dis-
tantly) to a Rwandin Tutsi family. As the
guerilla activities increased in intensity
Museveni's links with Rwandan Tutsi led
to increasing rhostility between Ugandan
officials and people towards the Tutsi
living there in.exile. This in turn led to
more Tutsi ioiningwhat was now Museve-
ni's National Resistance Army (NRA),
which eventually succeeded in ousting the
Obote regime in 1.985. By then a number of
Tutsi had risen to very prominent
positions within the NRA.
Once in power, Museveni's position
depended upon accommodating the vari-
ous factions within the country who
resented the connection with the Rwandan
Tutsi. Seeing the direction of Ugandan
politics, the Rwandan Tutsi community in
Uganda became more determined to
return to their own country. In 1988, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which also
included some Hutu opposed to the
Habyarimana regime, was formally
created in Kampala with the objective not
just of ensuring the return of those Tutsi in
exile, but changing the political regime in
Rwanda. Within Rwanda the position of
the government was weakened by a com-
birration of deteriorating economic con-
ditions (resulting from the dramatic
decline in the intemational price of coffee,
which was Rwanda's primary export) and
opposition to regionally based, autocratic
rule. Habyarimana was also coming under
pressure from France and other donor
countries to move away from the one-
party system by allowing new political
parties to develop.
By failing to deal with the festering
refugee problem before 1990, both the
Rwandan and the Ugandan governments,
as well as the wider intemational
community, set the stage for future con-
flict. Although the issue of Rwandan
refugees in Uganda defied easy solution,
opportunities that had existed remained
unexplored or were not aggressively pur-
sued. With the exception of Tanzania,
those regional states that were not indiffer-
ent were part of the problem, while more
distant states showed little interest.
UNHCR, overburdened and understaffed,
lacked the political or economicleverage to
help resolve the issue, which, at that time,
seemed minor in any global scale of
refugee problems.
THE CIVI WAR STARTS
On 1. October 199O, a well-armed force of
the military wing of the RPF invaded
northem areas of Rwanda from Uganda.
Much of the force was composed of
Rwandan Tutsi soldiers from the Ugandan
army and much of their armaments were
reputedly stolen from Ugandan army
stores. Though repulsed, the attack
signalled the start of the civil war in
Rwanda: a war which was used to increase
the intensity of fear and hatred and raise
the stakes of political survival.
The build-up of tension leading to the
1990 invasion by RPF forces was accom-
panied by many tell-tale signs, which
were inadequately monitored. When the
invasion was a fait accompli, however, it
attracted considerable international
concern and reaction, both in the region
and in Europe. France and Zaire came
to the aid of the Rwandan govern-
ment. Other actors, including Belgium,
the OAU and key regional state$,
initiated diplomatic efforts to defuse the
conflict.
The initial diplomatic efforts even-
tually led to a series of peace talks,
initiated and led by the OAU and Tanzania
and held at Arusha in Tanzania. The
process, begun in August L992, rcceived
considerable international attention, and
resulted in a comprehensive settlement,
the Arusha Accords, signed in August
1993. The United Nations assumed formal
responsibility for overseeing the imple-
mentation of the Arusha Accords, includ-
ing the provision of peace-keepers, and in
the process limited the role of the OAU
and local African states. As a consequence,
there was. a disjuncture between the
mediation and implementation phases
which served to undermine the Accords.
From 19XJ onwards, civil violence
against the minority Tutsi community and
critics of the Habyarimana regime had
gtadually escalated. Observers commonly
linked the violence to the civil war, either
as retaliatory measures or as warnings to
the advancing RPF forces. However, two
authoritative reports 
- 
one by an indepen-
dent International Commission of Inquiry
(FIDH, 1993), and another Prepared for
the UN Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR, 1994) 
- 
suggested a more radi-
cal and comprehensive design that fore-
shadowed events to come. Both reports
determined that the killings were geno-
cidal in nature and that existing authorities
were deeply involved. As the war conti-
nued and the outlines of a Peace formula
took shape, persistent reports indicated
that Hutu extremists were organising and
arming themselves to de-rail the peace
process and massacre 'internal enemies'.
The creation of documented structures of
violence (death squads, death lists, and
later, hate propaganda inciting violence)
provided warnings of a potential
genocide,
The UN Commission on Human
Rights took little notice of its own report.
Except for pointed diplomatic protests by
Belgium, the findings of the international
human rights inqurry were mostly buried
away in national ministries and the UN
system. With the partial exception of
Canada, no state observed the recommen-
dation to impose strict human rights con-
ditionality on aid transfers. Some states
were indifferent; others were concerned
but concluded that the ongoing democrati
sation process and the peace talks'required
their continued economic and political
support, particulatly since the peace
agreement under negotiation would
produce a new governmental structure
that, it was hoped, would address human
rights abuses. In this way, donors were
held hostage to their own policies.
Human rights organisations and states
were also at odds over the issue of arms
supplies. In L992 and 1993, the former
recommended that states (France and
Uganda were obvious targets) cut off all
arms supplies to the parties in the conflict.
France openly defended its role and the
right of a sovereign state to support a
beleaguered friendly government. Uganda
denied any involvement in helping the
rebel army, /et its territory constituted the
rear base for the RPF forces
Would aid conditionality and an inter-
national arms embargo in the 199f93
period have defused the conflict and pre-
vented the genocide? Effective use of
human rights conditionality is difficult,
requiring fine-tuned and timely interven-
tion. Arguably, there were windows of
opportunity, particularly in mid-1992,
when more pressure could have been
applied to the Habyarimana regime to deal
with the extremist forces as well as the
critical issue of impunity. Also military
assistance (direct and indirect) to the
Rwandan protagonists could have been
calibrated better with the continuing peace
process, particularly in dealing with the
central issue of extremist forces who
opposed the Arusha process and resultant
Accords.
Though such speculations are debat-
able, firmer conclusions can be drawn
about what did happen. By not standing
firm on human rights conditionality,
donors collectively sent the message that
their priorities lay elsewhere. By permit-
ting arms to reach the Rwandan protago-
nists, the possibilities for demilitarising
the conflict were reduced. Arms supplies
reinforced the determination of both par-
ties.to seek a military and forceful solution
to a political conllict. They strengthened
the RPF's ability to advance militarily.
They permitted the government to equip
and expand its almed forces as well as
para-military units, both of which became
involved in the genocide.
When, as a result of the Arusha
process, the Hutu extremists were
excluded from the key instruments of the
transitional government and marginalised
in the political process, alternative strate-
gies were not developed to 'de-fang'those
extremists. The UN force (UNAMIR) sent
to oversee the implementation of the peace
agreement was given a mandate tailored
to a classic, minimalist peace-keeping
operation. Yet the force faced a situation
considered by many, including some of
those who planned the operation, as
dangerously unstable,
As the architects of the Arusha
Accords had foreseen, conditions in
Rwanda suggested a mandate with broad
powers to protect civilians and seize arms
caches. Further, the UN Security Council
established a force that was structured and
financed to satisfy a cost-conscious United
States, increasingly unwilling to support
UN peace-keeping, rather than to meet the
needs on the ground. The force was
inadequately supported (although rela-
tiveiy rapid given the normally cumber-
some UN procedures), and only slowly
deployed relative to the need for speed
(considered essential to maintain the peace
process). The operation had no flexibility
to respond to changing circumstances, in
particular those caused by the crisis in
neighbouring Burundi in October L993.
In the rnonths immediately preceding
the genocide, many additional signs indi-
cated that the implementation of the
Arusha Accords was faltering and that
massive violence was being planned. The
air was full of extremist rhetoric on radio,
in public rallies and at o{ficial cocktail
parties. There were assassinations and
organised violence. Detailed intelligence
reports were passed to New York and the
Belgian military authorities by the un-
official UNAMIR intelligence unit docu-
menting the military training of militias,
hidden arms caches and plans for violent
action. Unequivocal warnings reached the
UN Secretariat on 1L |anuary 1994 regard-
ing a planned coup, an assault on the UN
forces to drive them out, provocations to
resume the civil war, and even detailed
plans for carrying out genocidal killings in
the capital. The cable was placed in a
separate black-coloured file, designed to
draw attention to the gravity of its content,
and circulated to several departments in
the UN Secretariat. However, senior
officials in the Secretariat questioned the
validity of the information and made no
contingency plans for worst-case
scenarios. Similar intelligence failures
were evident at the state level, particularly
in France and Belgium, both of which had
a considerable capacity for overt and
covert information gathering in Rwanda at
the time.
Thus pieces of information were avail-
able that, if combined and analysed,
would have permitted policy-makers to
draw the conclusion that both political
assassinations and genocide might occur,
and that the scale would be different from
past patterns (1959-53; 1991-3) of 'just'
hundreds or thousands of victims. Yet this
analysis was not done. Although some
had available fragments of prescient and
significant information, the enormity of
the genocide took virtually all by surprise.
The failure to anticipate planned and
targeted mass murder was particularly
significant given the political commitment
and actual involvement of the UN in
Rwanda, the legal right and moral obli-
gation to act to prevent genocide according
to the Genocide Convention, and the
enormous cost of a miscalculation.
While mandated to help implement
the peace agreement, the UN made no
preparations to deal with a breakdown of
the Accords, except to withdraw. Nor
were there contingency preparations to
deal with the plans to scuttle the Accords
or the massive violence plotted by the
extremists. Generally, the UN Secretariat
interpreted UNAMIR's mandate and rules
of engagement narrowly, and on several
occasions denied the Force Commander
permission to search for and seize arms
caches. When developments in early L994
further eroded the peace accords, the
Secretary-General and the Security
Council threatened to withdraw the UN
force, hence strengthening the hands of
the extremists. No member of the Security
Council carne forward to suggest a differ-
ent course of action. On the contrary, the
Council kept UNAMIR on a tight leash
with only a three, months' authorisation,
accompanied by admonitions of caution
and emphasising the importance of
cost-cutting.
CRISIS AND RESPONSE: APRIL TO IUNE
'1994
In the months before the crisis struck,
UNAMIR's presence contributed to a false
sense of security in Rwanda. When events
came to a head on 6 April, the UN
collectively failed to respond. There was
an absence of leadership at UN head-
quarters in New York. The Secretary-
General, traveiling at a brisk pace through
Europe, misread the nature of the conflict.
The understaffed and ovetstretched
Department of Peace-keeping Operations
seemed paralysed. In the Security
Council, the killing of 10 Belgian peace-
keepers created a political surge to with-
draw, although this was not recom-
mended by UNAMIR's Force Commander
nor by the African countries contributing
troops. Information on the genocide under
way was already available when the final
decision was made to reduce the force
drastically.
Once the direction and magnitude of
the genocide became undeniabli:, the UN
reversed itself and accepted an obligation
to protect civilians. However, the realisa:
tion of this peace-keeping mission
(UNAMIRII) was hampered by the unwill-
ingness of key mernbers tq pay for or
provide troops, and to match troops with
equipment in an expeditious manaer. The
force was deployed ordy after the genocide
and the civil war had run their course.
France's role in Rwanda was signifi-
cant in its many contradictions. While
warning the Security Council in early 1993
that massacres were a real possibility,
France supported a regime that was
deeply compromised by human rights
violations. France uged the UN, rather
than the OAU, to take the lead in monitor-
ing and implementing the peace agree-
ment, but subsequently did little to sup-
port UNAMIR I. Nor did France pledge
support for UNAMIR II, even though the
French Foreign Minister was the first
cabinet member of a government holding a
permanent seat on the Security Council to
identify the massacres as gerrocide (16 May
t994). With the aid of some of its African
ex-colonies, France subsequently under-
took a unilateral intervention, Opdration
Turquoise, endorsed by a Chapter VII
Security Council resolution. The action
saved many lives and undoubtedly pre-
vented an additional mass outflow of
refugees from the south-west of Rwanda,
but came very late: two and a half months
after the genocide commenced and when
the civil war was almost over. Further,
because of France's historical role in the
country, the intervention was open to
misinterpretation, and did not serve to
disarm the extremists or prevent sus-
pected organisers of the genocide from
escaping.
During the whole conflict, but
especially after the coup on 6 April, the
media, with some notable exceptions,
failed to report accurately and adequately
on a crir4e against humanity. This signifi-
cantly contributed to international lack of
interest in the genocide and the conse-
quent inadequate response. Too many
reports conformed to stereotyPical notions
of tribal violence and orgies of killing
rather than to the power struggle and
systematic slaughter of Hutu moderates as
well as Tutsi that was under wav.3
FAILURES OF EARLY WARNING
Whatever the failures in media coverage,
prime responsibility for the failure to read
the signals and respond adequately cannot
be placed on the media. Why were the
signals that were sent ignored? Why were
they not translated into effective conflict
management? The failwe of early warning
is attributable to many factors. The UN
was poorly organised to collect and flag
information about human rights violations
and certainly genocide. There was a failure
in both the UN system and the NGO
community to link human rights repods to
dynamic analyses of social conflict so as to
provide strategic policy choices. There also
existed an internal predisposition by a
nurnber of the key actors to deny the
possibility of genocide because facing up
to it would have required them to alter
their course of action. The mesmerisation
with the success of Arusha and the failure
in Somalia together cast long shadows and
distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda.
The vast quantity of 'noise' from other
crises worldwide preoccupied world
leaders. The confusion between genocide
as a legal term, referring primarily to an
intent, and the popular association of
genocide with massive murder in the
order of hundreds of thousands, created
confusion. Finally, a general desensitisa-
tion developed with respect to mass
slaughters in Rwanda and Burundi, and
the possibility of. a massive genocide
actually occurring seemed beyond belief.
Maior states with the capacity to
monitor and anticipate the crisis were
either not interested, or, if interested,
were unwilling to undermine a friendly
govemment. [n such a situation, interna-
tional organisations exist in part to pick up
the slack, but neither the UN nor the OAU
did so in the Rwanda case. The UN had
poorly developed structures for systemati-
cally collecting and analysing inlormation
in a manner relevant to preventive diplo-
macy and conflict management. The
newly formed inter-agency arrangement
for humanitarian early warning (HEWS)
was oriented mainly towards humanitar-
ian operations; it was not equipped to
detect or analyse political and military
warning signals.
Within the Secretariat, information
collection and policy analysis was divided
among the Department of Political Affairs
(DPA), the Department of Peace-keeping
Operations (DPKO) and the Department
of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). There was
also a disjuncture between information
collection, analysis and the development
of strategic policy options. Thus DPA was
assigned the responsibility for monitoring
events in the region, but not for develop-
ing related strategic policy options. One of
the most significant sources for early
warning, the UN humanrights monitoring
system, was not part of the information-
gathering structure in the Secretariat and,
arguably, became isolated from the
decision-making process. In the field, the
UN had no formal capacity for collecting
intelligence; nevertheless, UNAMIR,
through the initiatives of both the
Canadian Force Commander and the Bel-
gian Kigali-sectot Commander, succeeded
in running small, if irregular, intelligence
operations. The other main organisation
concerned, the OAU, had virtually no
capacity at all for early warning data
collection and policy analysis.
Yet the shortcomings of early warning
in the Rwanda case go further. The issue is
not better quantitative data or formal
modelling. The UN lacked a system for
drawing on existing information sources,
in the region and outside, from specialists
in state agencies, academic institutions,
human rights monitoring agencies, and
the various agencies of the UN itself. The
UN lacked a specialised unit, without
operational responsibilities, for analysing
such information and translating that
analysis into evolving strategic options
that can be channelled directly to the
Secretary-General.
Both the UN and NGOs failed to relate
human rights monitoring to analysis of the
development of social conflict and, hence,
to assess the direction of everits. When the
UN became involved in a peace-keeping
mission, the monitoring of political deve-
lopments was not linked with contingency
preparedness. Without contingency plan-
ning, the UN was left with a short time
frame and few re$ources to respond to
sudden changes in the situation. This
point is critical for two reasons: even
under the best of circumstances, it is
impossible to pin-point specific future
outcomes of complex social conflict;
second, the absence of contingency plan-
ning limits both what the decision-makers
will hear and the options they are willing
to consider.
Despite the shortcomings of early
waming, at the critical stage the relevant
actors dealing with Rwanda knew that the
situation was unstable and dangerous. Yet
the sustained and careful attention so
necessary to successful conllict manage-
ment was lacking. [n part, early action is
problematic and preventive diplomacy is
inherently difficult because outcomes are
uncertain, reflecting the typical complexity
of cause-and-effect relations in social and
political conflict. Moreover, policy-makers
who are continuously faced with actual
cises are disinclined to pay attention to
hypothetical ones, even though exper-
ience tells us that 'prevention is better
than cure'. The lack of international
investment in early conflict regulation
signified a more fundamental disinterest
in Rwanda. The UN Security Council
authorised only the most minimal peace-
keeping force, and the Secretariat insisted
that UNAMIR maintain a low profile.
When the crisis struck, and it became clear
that massive genocide was under way,
there was still no effective international
action.
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Throughout, some individual and collec-
tive actors did the most with the least
under difficult or adverse circumstances.
Human rights NGOs monitored the situa-
tion. Tanzania struggled to turn the
Arusha process into effective preventive
diplomacy. LINAMIR I tried to function
proactively, despite tight reins before 6
Aptil. Many remaining units, including
the ICRC, bravely sought to save civilians
once the killings started. This could not
compensate, however, for the overall
failure of the international community to
attempt to prevent or stop the genocide, or
its very inadequate efforts to mitigate it. In
one sense, the inaction can be seen as a
result of the propensity of states to be
guided by narrow self-interest rather than
moral obligations to uphold international
norms of iustice. However, this propensity
has historically varied over time and place;
its prominence in the Rwanda case, there-
fore, requires additional explanation.
No state involved in the conflict hap-
pened at the time to have the optimal
combination of interest, capacity and neu-
trality that could have generated appro-
priate early warnings and translated them
into conflict-mitigation strategies. More
fundamentally, the Rwanda conflict
occurred in a period when the United
Nations was acting in an expansive yet
highly selective fashion, reflecting a struc-
l
tural mismatch between the responsibili-
ties of international institutions and inter-
ests of states in the post-Cold War world.
Revitalised by the end of the Cold
War, the UN in the 1990s rapidly
expanded its peace-keeping operations
throughout the world. Rwanda was added
to the list in October 1993. The framework
for peace-keeping was, however, set by
the distribution of power in the Security
Council, which represented the world as it
was half a century ago. Apart from France,
the maior powers on the Council were
uninterested in a small Central African
country that was marginal to their econ-
omic or political concerns and peripheral
to international strategic rivalries. By their
power of veto and finances, the Perma-
nent Five controlled the peace-keeping
and enforcement operations of the UN.
The only state with a demonstrated ability
to energise the Council in a crisis, the
United States, was haunted by memories
of Somalia and determined not to get
involved in another African conflict. It was
also preoccupied with crises elsewhere,
especially in Bosnia and Haiti. The lack of
interest in Rwanda on the part of the maior
Western states left France to define a large
part of the policy field; the result was to
magnify the consequences, negative as
well as positive, of unilateralism.
Within the UN system as a whole,
there was no locus for assessing key policy
questions. How, for instance, can the
democratisation process be promoted
without exacerbating ethnic and regional
tensions or creating excuses for human
rights violations? How are extremists to be
controlled? Moreover, there was too little
effort at policy co-ordination when oppor-
tunities appeared.
The rationale for UN peace-keeping is
that it provides a neutral force, indepen-
dent of partisan interest. However, parti-
san interests can provide motivation and
energy to be directed at a problem when a
commitment to conflict resolution per se is
lacking. This is the conundrum. Without
either kind of interest, the UN as a
collective actor was unable to mount an
adequate peace-keeping force expedi
tiously and cut through the Byzantine
problems endemic to UN peace-keeping.
The mix-and-match system of deployment
was slow and inadequate. Lacking a
powerful patron in the Security Council,
the Rwandan operation was subject to
cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures
that involved delays and inflexibility, and
gave insufficient autonomy to the leader-
ship in the field.
The international community might
have responded better had the early warn-
ing systems generated a clearer anticipa-
tion of forthcoming events. On the other
hand, conflict management is a function of
interest and capacity, not only to ensuring
that information is collected and commu-
nicated, but to react. In this respect,
regionalism appears as a critical and posi-
tive force that was not sufficiently recog-
nised or utilised. Structures of conflict
resolution and peace-keeping could have
been strengthened by more involvement
of regional and sub-regional actors (the
OAU and the sub-regional grouping of the
states in the Great Lakes area) in the
decision and management structures.
After all, these actors had definite interests
in the conflict and a critical stake in the
outcome. Strengthening regional rnecha-
nisms for conflict resolution and peace-
keeping will require financial support from
richer states since most of the world's
conflicts occur in regions where the parties
have the fewest resources to deal with
them. The consequence of these cumulative
fault lines in the intemational system was
an inability to stop or significantly mitigate a
genocide of immense proportions.
Notes
1.. The area which now forms Rwanda and
Burundi was administered bv German
colonial authorities based in Dar-es-Salaam
between 1899 and L916. Belgium occu-
pied the area during the First World War
and subsequently administered the terri-
tories under mandates first of the
League of Nations and subsequently of the
UN.
2. In part such criticisms were influenced by
the Eastern Bloc and Non-aligned view that
the Tutsi political parties represented the
most effective and radical opposition to
Belgian colonialism.
3. On 12 April, for instance, the Nal York Times
stated that the Hutu Prime Minister Agathe
' Uwilingiyimana who was killed by hoops
and militia on 7 April, in the same attack
which resulted in killing of 10 Belgian
soldiers serving in UNAMI& was a Tutsi in
an apparent attempt to mould reality to the
notion that the events were simply Hutu
versus Tutsi.
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